The Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 led to the creation of a new set of political institutions within Northern Ireland and between Great Britain and the island of Ireland. A central tenet of the agreement was to promote cross-border cooperation on an all Ireland and border region basis and, consequently, the new institutional setting for this cooperation forms the core of this research. The article will first sketch an analytical approach that enables the analysis to address new policy processes, the state authority, and the multitude of actors involved. Secondly, it will proceed to an in-depth description of the genesis of the implementation of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation in the context of the Irish border region. The examination will encompass a description and analysis of the development of the European specific border region programme 'INTERREG' and the limited results achieved by cross-border cooperation in such framework. Finally, the article will interconnect the creation of new political institutions within Northern Ireland and between North and South with experiences of regionalism and peacebuilding in order to analyse how processes of EU integration and association are related to border conflict amelioration on the island of Ireland.
Introduction
The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA), and subsequent accords 1 , provided the supreme structure for ending the violent conflict in Northern Ireland: the agreement involved a carefully and standardised political accommodation between the main political groups on one side, and the British and Irish governments on the other. The main objective was to provide constitutional mechanisms for the pursuit of nationalist aspirations for Irish reunification, balanced against the recognition that such change could only come about with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. In addition, a cross-border dimension was made manifest in the institutions provided by the GFA and, on the face of it, it is possible to assess that the British-Irish improved relationship helped to deliver a North/South institutional architecture that reflected the cross-border cooperation thrust of Europeanization and prefigured an era of cross-border cooperation focused on the island of Ireland (Hayward, 2006; Laffan, 2005; Todd, 2011) .
The impetus for the creation of linkages across the Irish border came from the promise to open the territorial cage of the state to enable the development of inter-cultural dialogue and inter-communal relations on the island (McCall, 2014: p. 40-42) .
Nonetheless, in recent years, much of the academic debate focused on the partial success of this strategy for conflict amelioration before 1998, since cross-border cooperation (with its challenge to territory, borders and identity) was viewed as a threat to the national culture and national identity and because of the centralized nature of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and the UK governments (McLoughlin, Phinnemore, McGowan, McCall, 2012; Murphy, 2014; Acheson, Milofsky, 2008; Tannam, 1999; Laffan, Payne, 2001) . Accordingly, this article examines the genesis of the European Union (EU) cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland, in order to preliminarily describe how this provided the first backdrop and context for challenging the 'zero-sum' logic of the Northern Ireland conflict. The 'peacebuilding from below approach' advocated by Lederach (1997) will be influential of this work.
Lederach argues that peace requires a peace process to be firmly embedded in the 'Grassroots Leadership' of the local community (Lederach, 1997: p. 26 ), but critics contend that the conflict exacerbation versus conflict transformation orientation of grassroots leaders, as well as their location, is open to questioning (McCall, 2013: p. 206) . Nevertheless, it is now generally accepted that the engagement of the 'grassroots' is an essential component of peacebuilding and, accordingly, conflict amelioration, as used in this article, attempts to capture a peacebuilding effort wherein political violence has reduced, competing ethno-nationalist political elites have entered into policy-making processes and, crucially, local private network have been engaged in an on-going peacebuilding effort. On one hand the article will investigate the causes of the limited impacts of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation initiatives in Northern Ireland prior to 1998. On the other hand, it will interconnect these experiences to the challenging new era of peace, in which, by including features of economic development, cross-border cooperation, and social inclusion, the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2 became the ultimate EU instrument for building peace in Northern Ireland.
This article argues that the specific issues raised from the past experiences in EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation stand as the basis of the EU capacity for answering more efficiently to the region necessities after 1998. The article will first sketch an analytical approach that enables the analysis to address new policy processes, the state authority, and the multitude of actors involved. Secondly, it will proceed to an in-depth description of the genesis of the implementation of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation in the context of the Irish border region. The examination will encompass a description and analysis of the development of the European specific border region programme 'INTERREG', and the limited results achieved by cross-border cooperation through INTERREG I and II (1994 -2001 ), with INTERREG III (2000 which was far more successful. Finally, the article will make a preliminary interconnection between regionalism and peacebuilding as the motives for the creation of the EU PEACE funding in a changing political and institutional environment.
Government, Governance, Metagovernance: a framework analysis
Cross border cooperation has emerged as a major challenge for the EU and for member state governments in past and in recent decades. Partly for these reasons, and reflecting wider trends in governance, scholars have argued that governments have become increasingly wary of top-down prescriptive or intergovernmental approaches to cross-border cooperation (Murphy, 2014: p. 195 ) and have instead favoured market-based (Teague, 1996) and network or partnership-based modes of governance (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Keating, 2004; Rhodes 1996: p. 662; Rhodes, 2007 Rhodes, : p. 1246 Rhodes, 2007 Rhodes, : p. 1247 ).
Indeed, since the '80s, there has been a perception that traditional forms of hierarchical government are being complemented if not displaced by network modes of governance Jessop, 1998: p. 32 ).
Pervious scholarships have often employed notions of intergovernmentalism and Multi-LevelGovernance (MLG) (Marks, 1996: p. 30 ) to analyse the role of different actors in the development and implementation of cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland (Murphy, 2014; Laffan, Payne, 2001; Tannam, 1999) . MLG is defined as 'a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers in which supranational, national, regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks ' (Marks, 1993: p. 402-403) . This definition raises some problems of applicability to Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland cross-border relationship developed in the framework of the EU as it neglects Northern Ireland's socio-spatial structuring principles (Jessop, 2016: p. 20) , the autonomous role of the other two states involved, and ignores tangled scalar state and network hierarchies (Piattoni, 2009) . Hence, overall, the contrasting logics of territorialisation, which are consequent to cross-border cooperation implementation, are deeply problematic for government and governance and its analysis. Scholars (Laffan, Payne, 2001; Tannam, 1999) have related the issue to complex interdependence to justify the need for greater intergovernmental relations and/or MLG, but this justification underplays the complexities of governing the Northern Ireland geographical space as well as to problems grounded in other kinds of spatial dynamics and private networks (Jessop, 2016: p. 21 ). This argument indicates the need to look beyond the territory of the EU and/or its internal scalar division to study networks that crosscut the territorial boundary of the Irish border and are transversal to specific scalar hierarchies.
Accordingly this article argues that governments and networks governance remain central to all forms of governance within the EU, the Community having always been studiously respectful of the independence of the member-states involved in the promotion and support of cross-border activities on the island of Ireland. In Northern Ireland these have firstly privileged the position of the Irish and UK governments, and only subsequently interactions with non-state actors. From here lies the need to 'bring government back in' (Bell, Park, 2006: p. 64 ) when analysing governance, especially in relation to the concept of 'metagovernance', which includes not only government and governance, but policy networks as well (Rhodes, 1996) .
'Metagovernance' can be defined as the 'government of governance ' (Jessop, 2016: p. 13 It is nonetheless necessary to emphasise that INTERREG III had been framed and developed in a very different context to earlier EU cross-border programmes. Additional actors joined the system of public policy-making, their number increasing with the establishment of the executive in Northern Ireland.
These processes had in turn an impact on the structure of networks and on the interaction within the network and between the network and the EU. Furthermore, a certain degree of institutional learning implies that those involved in previous programmes will have learnt from that experience and will want to apply the fruits of that learning. Thus, the influence that different actors have within a policy network is also dependent on their role in different phases of the policy process and on the context in which they act.
'Metagovernance', by involving official and 'behind the scenes' practices, helps this article to grasp how,
given that the UK government was usually very reluctant to formally relinquish power, stakeholder participation in cross-border EU networks appears to go further than an advisory role from INTERREG III onwards, with the Irish and Northern Ireland actors effectively 'ruling the game', enhancing thus their place in the EU policy-making system.
Cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland
The surfacing literature related to the Irish border (partly developed as a consequence of Brexit)
demonstrates how its establishment is still contested; it was never normalised or fully accepted (Hayward, Campbell, Murphy, 2017; Hayward, 2017; Hayward, Komarova, 2016; Hayward, 2001) . 
Contradictory attitudes towards EU cross-border cooperation
As it has been briefly stated above, the reasons for INTERREG I and II failing to fully attain their objectives have been identified by scholars as linked to the deeply rooted problems of the political symbolism of cross-border cooperation and to the centralised nature of the British and Irish states (O'Dowd, Corrigan, Moore, 1995; Tannam, 1999; O'Dowd, 1992) . 'INTERREG is still one of the most popular programmes of Europe and it lasts the challenge of time. We -the Unionists -were suspicious of its aim of changing theoretically and concretely the meaning of "border". We tried to resist, while the programme persisted through the years and I now consider it as one of the best programmes ever delivered in the border regions of the island by the EU.'
(Interview with Jim Nicholson, Member of the EP for the Ulster Unionist Party, 27 January 2015)
From a metagovernance perspective the centralised and hierarchical nature of the Irish and UK states, highlighted above, had a major impact on the spatial implementation of public policies and on the role of territory in the system of government in both jurisdictions (Whitehead, 2003: p. 8 
36).
Devolution in Britain and Northern Ireland, together with regionalisation in the Republic and the NorthSouth Strand of the GFA, subsequently generated processes that had a long-term impact on the system of public policy-making. Rather than one hierarchical centre, the system became more layered with different spatial areas involved in the planning and delivery of programmes. North-South cooperation was fostered by the two states, by parallel developments in civil society, and by the self-organized networks (Tannam, 1999: p. 204) . Accordingly the next section will explore the intersection of institution building under the GFA, changes in the EU INTERREG III, and networks in the Irish border region.
The EU INTERREG III
The GFA and the whole process of devolution altered the dynamics of the internal political and policy Thus the networks began to re-position themselves during the latter half of INTERREG II as they sought a more significant role in the design and implementation of INTERREG III. They learnt from their past experience and, in order to take a more active part in the policy-process they firstly addressed a number of key issues: they aimed to expand the concept of partnership as part of a specific lobbying process of local councilors and civil servants to support their local stances. Then they sought to strategically approach the plans and sub-programs on an area-based perspective, as each border county was different and thus had different needs. Finally, they were very specific in articulating what role they could or wished to play in relation to INTERREG III (Interview with Andy Pollak, 28 November 2015).
They had to address all of these issues in an unstable and changing political and institutional environment, with the coordinators maintaining extremely close contact with each other 'so that they would have their voice enhanced' (Interview with Patrick Colgan, 10 May 2016).
In addition, at the end of 1998, the three main networks (North West Region Cross Border Group; Irish Central Border Area Network, and East Border Region LTD) decided to prepare a report on a 'Border Corridor Strategy' (Stutt, 1999) to address changes in relationships among the border groups, other local organizations, the two governments, and the EU (Stutt, 1999: p. 30-65) . The text touched on issues such as the importance of the communication channel opened by SEUPB, which favored a straightforward approach to the Commission, instead of the network voice being represented at the supranational level by the two administrations. It needs to be taken into account that the ability of the actors to persuade the two governments to give them a greater role depended in some measure on their capacity for internal change The example of the management and implementation of the EU programme for cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland provides useful empirical insights into the nature of networks governance and associated metagovernance arrangements. The case study examined in this paper revealed that metagovernance involves government in the form of an omnipresent 'hand' of the state, and, as a result, it directly impacts the outcomes of governance. The Commission, while supporting the networks in their attempts at carving out a role for themselves in the policy-making processes, recognised the importance of the ministerial level in Northern Ireland. It has thus always acted through the 'highlevel' of politics, arguing that an essential part of INTERREG was devoted to secure stable institutional structures and decision-making processes to facilitate genuine cross-border cooperation. Metagovernance included actions such as identifying key stakeholders, setting agendas, and structuring outcomes.
The main achievement of the EU in overcoming issues has been to provide instruments to the networks to be juxtaposed to the administrations' management. Networks, private actors, and interest groups remain dependant on EU support. Institutions and 'high-politics' also owe in part their long-lasting existence to the economic and political support of the EU, which ensured their functioning on the longterm perspective. What will the future be in the shadow of Brexit? 2 Commonly known as the PEACE founding, the PEACE package or the PEACE programs.
